Advocate Vivek Nasa

  Understanding Section 411 IPC By Vivek Nasa Associates In the case of  Trimbak vs. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 39 , the Court clarified that to prove a charge under  Section 411 of the IPC , the prosecution must establish: The accused was in possession of stolen property. Someone else had possession of the property before the accused. The accused knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the accused knew the gold was stolen. The identity of the gold was also not confirmed, so it could not be classified as stolen property. Even if the accused received demand drafts and purchased gold bars, the prosecution needed to show the accused knew the drafts were obtained fraudulently or was part of a conspiracy . Vivek Nasa Associates Vivek Nasa Associates  is a trusted  criminal defense law firm in Gurugram , specializing in  bail , anticipatory bail , court representation, and trial defense . Our expert law...

  Waiver of Cooling-Off Period for  Mutual Consent Divorce in India   By Vivek Nasa Associates The concept of  mutual consent divorce  was introduced in India to provide an amicable and less adversarial way for couples to end their marriage when they find it irreparable. Under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , and similar provisions in other personal laws, couples can file for divorce by mutual consent  if they have been living separately for at least one year and agree that the marriage cannot be sustained. However, one of the most debated aspects of this provision is the mandatory “cooling-off period” of six months between the first and second motions for divorce . This raises the question: Can the cooling-off period for mutual consent divorce in India be waived off? Understanding the Cooling-Off Period The cooling-off period is a statutory requirement designed to give couples time to reconsider their decision to divorce . It acts as a safegua...

It is a settled position of law that the High Court possesses inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings — including an FIR or charge-sheet — where the interest of justice so demands. This authority, now codified under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (previously Section 482 CrPC), is not curtailed merely by procedural developments such as the filing of a charge-sheet. In Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel & Another v. State of Gujarat & Ors. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash an FIR and all consequential proceedings even after a charge-sheet has been filed, if the allegations — taken at face value — do not disclose the commission of any offence, or if the continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law or of the Court. In Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2011) 7 SCC 59], it was further clarified that the filing of a charge-sheet after the...

Supreme court: Interim Compensation u/s 143 Negotiable Instruments Act in Cheque Dishonour Cases is discretionary not Mandatory Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.143A(1) – Grant of interim compensation – Directory or mandatory: HELD : The power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary, not mandatory. This sub-section allows for the issuance of an order for interim compensation against the accused in a complaint under Section 138, even before any determination of guilt. This power can be exercised at the initial stage, even before evidence is recorded. Interpreting the word ‘may’ as ‘shall’ would have severe consequences, requiring the accused in every Section 138 complaint to pay up to 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation. Such an interpretation would be unjust and contrary to established principles of fairness and justice. It could also render the provision arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Given the significant implications of exe...